As Nepal paints itself into a corner on Kalapani issue, India must tread carefully
The Indian Express
Dated: June 12, 2020
By: Shyam Saran
On June 10, Nepal’s House of Representatives unanimously
approved the tabling of an amendment to the country’s constitution which will
now formally depict nearly 400 sq km of Indian territory extending west from
the Lipulekh Pass, and including it, as part of Nepal’s sovereign territory.
While it remains to be passed by the Upper House and signed by the president,
the die has been cast. In doing so, Nepal has etched its territorial claim in
stone which would make any concession by this or any future government of Nepal
virtually unthinkable.
After the
vote, Nepal’s Foreign Minister Pradeep Kumar Gyawali declared: “We are for
starting dialogue soon. The problem will be resolved through diplomacy.” Short
of expecting India to accept the fait accompli determined unilaterally by
Nepal, what will diplomacy achieve? India should be prepared to engage in a
dialogue on this and other outstanding border issues, but Nepal’s brinkmanship
has made it much more difficult to explore a mutually acceptable solution.
Gyawali said that the dialogue will be carried out “on the basis of historical
facts”. Perhaps that offers an opening although I doubt that any “facts” contrary
to what have been adduced by the Nepali side will be countenanced. But let us
review the “historical facts”.
One, Nepal
bases its claim to the additional territory now included in its official map on
the Anglo-Nepal Treaty of Sugauli of 1816, which determined the Kali river as
the western boundary between British India and Nepal. An East India Company map
has been produced from the archives to show that the British considered the
tributary of the Kali River, the Limpiyadhura, as its main channel. But a map
drawn up in 1879 after surveys had been carried out shows the boundary along a
ridge just west of the Tinker Pass.
As per this and later official British maps
and what India claims, Kali River originates from a natural spring at Kalapani,
where it is joined by a rivulet flowing down from Lipulekh Pass. This was not
challenged then nor at any time subsequently until after 1990. In fact, Nepali
maps have all along reflected the same alignment. Some Nepali journalists and
scholars now argue that the monarchy, first under King Mahendra and later under
King Birendra, was reluctant to raise this issue with India for fear of Indian
reaction. This is laughable as both the monarchs thrived on a diet of
anti-Indian nationalism.
Two, India had, in the early 1950s, set up, with the consent of
Nepal, a string of military-cum-police posts along the Nepal-China border after the Chinese occupied
Tibet. There were either 17 or 18 posts altogether and they remained in place
until 1969. In that year, Kirti Nidhi Bisht, the Nepali Prime Minister, on the
instructions of King Mahendra, asked Indira Gandhi to
withdraw all these posts from Nepali territory. This was done but the Indian
post at Kalapani was not in the Nepali list. When this is pointed out, the
answer is that Mahendra was being sensitive to India’s security concerns
vis-a-vis China and hence allowed an act of generosity to let India hold on to
Kalapani and access to Lipulekh Pass.
Again, is
this really believable? In 1969, China was in the thick of the Cultural
Revolution. There was limited activity on the India-China border. The central
sector where Kalapani lies and north of it, the pass itself, was the least
disputed sector.
Why would India plead for Mahendra’s generosity? When I was
India’s ambassador in Nepal, Kirti Nidhi Bisht told me that one of the proudest
moments in his life was when he “stood down” Indira Gandhi and compelled her to
withdraw each and every military post from Nepal’s territory. He did not
mention then that the Indian posts at Kalapani and at Lipulekh Pass continued
to be on Nepali territory. To be fair, he did so later before his death in
2017.
Three, China
and Nepal reached a border agreement in 1961. Article 1 in the agreement
describes the western extremity of the China-Nepal border and this conforms to
the alignment claimed by India. “The Chinese-Nepalese border starts from the
point where the watershed between the Kali River and the Tinker River meets the
watershed between the tributaries of the Mapchu(Karnali) River on the one hand
and the Tinker River on the other, thence it runs south-eastward along the
watershed.”
One should
note the word “starts” which is important in view of what follows. In
subsequent demarcation, Pillar No 1, which marks this starting point at the
western extremity, is located at Tinker Pass, well east of Lipulekh Pass. This
cannot be refuted as this is in the formal documents. Buddhi Narayan Shrestha,
who has been responsible for putting out justification for the new claims
against India, is unable to deny it either. But he now says that the
trijunction at this end has not been determined and that notionally it would be
pillar number zero on the boundary! This is the first time one has heard of the
concept of a “number zero border pillar”! This is ex post facto justification
and the dishonesty behind it is glaring. A Nepali diplomat has repeated this
same specious argument,
“Given the situation in 1961, Nepal and China fixed pillar No 1
at Tinker Pass with the understanding that pillar number zero (trijunction of
Nepal, India and China) would be fixed later.” He has not adduced any evidence
that this indeed was the “understanding” reached with China in 1961.
Four, India
and China concluded an agreement in 1954 for trade and transit between India
and Tibet and among the six border passes listed for the purpose, Lipulekh was
included. There was no protest from the Nepali side. The first time that Nepal
protested formally was in 2015 when India and China signed an MoU for
conducting border trade between the two countries through Lipulekh Pass.
If facts are
to be the basis for an eventual solution one hopes that they would not be used
selectively. India-Nepal relations are far too important to be derailed by this
unfortunate display of cynical brinkmanship by Nepal’s short-sighted leaders.
India will need to tread carefully. While it should stand its ground on the
territorial issue, it should be willing to look at ways in which Nepali
sentiments could be assuaged. One could convey to Nepal that it may have
privileged access to the Kalapani area for trade or pilgrimage. Nepali citizens
may be permitted to use any infrastructure created in this or other border
areas for easier access from one part of Nepal to another.
Most
importantly, the Narendra Modi government needs to shed its
fond expectation that Nepal’s affinity with India because of its Hindu heritage
is sufficient to consolidate political relations with that country. Neither is
that shared heritage sufficient to prevent Nepal’s penchant to wave the China
card in India’s face whenever it seeks to advance its own interests. And
putting all eggs in the Oli basket, and in the bargain alienating other
important political constituencies over the recent past, has proved to be
costly.
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