Targeted money transfers using Aadhaar: A way to steal elections
Frontline
Print Edition September 27, 2019
Anupam Saraph
Print Edition September 27, 2019
Anupam Saraph
The use of targeted money transfers using Aadhaar
is a corrupt practice as defined under Section 123 of the Representation of the
People Act. But just 90 days before the 2019 Lok Sabha election, at least 41
million voters received gifts and gratification through direct benefit transfer
of at least Rs.623 billion through the PM-KISAN scheme.
Aleksandr Kogan, a professor of
Cambridge University, sought consent from users to take a psychometric survey
using his app, “This Is Your Digital Life”. The app required the users to log
into their Facebook accounts. While profiling the user, the app also captured
all the news feed, timeline, posts, messages, direct messages and data of the
friends of the user. This data were passed on to Cambridge Analytica CEO
Alexander Nix, who reportedly weaponised them in political campaigns in more
than 200 elections across the world. In 2017, Cambridge Analytica was caught on
camera confessing to the manipulation of elections in Mexico, Malaysia, Kenya,
Sri Lanka and Brazil. Cambridge Analytica was also contracted by Donald Trump
in the 2016 presidential election in the United States and by Arron Banks, the
co-founder of Leave.EU, in the 2016 Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom.
There was shock and outrage across
the globe against Cambridge Analytica and Facebook. In elections where they
were part of the campaign, they were accused of having manipulated the results
by their use of blackmail, bribes, coercion or replacement.
Meanwhile, in India, in February
2012, the Nandan Nilekani-led Task Force on an Aadhaar-Enabled Unified Payment
Infrastructure pushed for the use of Aadhaar numbers for direct benefit
transfer (DBT) to target subsidies, benefits and services to beneficiaries.
This called for the expansion of transfer of money, in place of subsidised goods
and services, and the use of Aadhaar numbers as a financial address of the
beneficiaries.
The use of the Aadhaar number as a
financial address for money transfer not only replaced subsidised goods or
services to beneficiaries, but it replaced money transfers to bank accounts of
beneficiaries that used the Reserve Bank of India’s (RBI ) National Electronic
Funds Transfer (NEFT). Since then, 452 government schemes across 56 Ministries
have been converted to DBT for targeted delivery of subsidies and benefits as
money to bank accounts. In most of these schemes, Aadhaar numbers are used to
transfer money to beneficiaries instead of their bank accounts even when the
bank accounts were readily available.
The transfer of money to Aadhaar
numbers, instead of the beneficiaries’ bank account numbers, requires the
seeding of Aadhaar numbers to beneficiary lists. Since money must ultimately go
to bank accounts, Aadhaar money transfers also require a separate mapping of
the Aadhaar number to a bank account. This is maintained by the National
Payments Corporation of India (NPCI), a non-governmental company that manages
Aadhaar payments. This mapping is updated by the NPCI on the basis of Aadhaar
numbers seeded to bank accounts by various member banks.
The Aadhaar numbers seeded to the
beneficiary lists and bank accounts, therefore, decide the targeting of the
subsidy or benefit to beneficiaries. Unlike a list of bank accounts of fixed
beneficiaries, the list of beneficiaries now becomes a volatile one that is
available for manipulation by seeding or deseeding Aadhaar numbers to
beneficiary lists or bank accounts, every time, before making money transfers.
It is strange that this push to use
Aadhaar for money transfers was made in the name of transparency as neither the
Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) nor the Ministry of Finance
nor the RBI certifies the Aadhaar numbers as those belonging to beneficiaries
or the accounts to which the money actually gets transferred as those with
Aadhaar numbers of the list of beneficiaries. The Comptroller and Auditor
General has never audited the need, or sanity, to use Aadhaar, which is an
uncertified, unverified and unaudited number, to decide inclusion or exclusion
from beneficiary lists. Neither has it verified whether those who actually
received the money through Aadhaar numbers were those who qualified as
beneficiaries. The use of Aadhaar for money transfers enabled an ecosystem of
private players to take control of targeting money transfers.
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