Why Imran Khan bats for Narendra Modi
The Indian Expressby Ayesha Siddiqa April 22, 2019
Reference:
It
seems that people from very odd quarters — such as Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan— want Narendra Modi to win
the upcoming elections. Khan’s recent comments, in which he desired victory for
his counterpart as good for the future of a peace initiative, may be driven by
pragmatic reasons, but it indicates the separation that exists between the two
countries. Following comments by the Opposition and in segments of the social media,
the federal information minister intervened and pretended that Khan, who can
often open his mouth before engaging his brain, was misunderstood.
Intriguingly,
despite India being the most significant country in the neighbourhood, its
election outcomes have marginal impact on the region. Khan’s statement, in
fact, indicates that disconnectedness in which the head of the government of a
neighbouring state refused to measure the implications beyond tactical effect.
It seems a right-wing government in India does not matter to Pakistan. Or,
perhaps, a Modi-led right-wing government is a wish come true for the
ideological right-wing in Pakistan. For the first time since 1947, people do
not have to convince each other of how right Muhammad Ali Jinnah was in
creating Pakistan: Not that Pakistan was ever designed for all Muslims of the
Indian subcontinent, but it now sees its formula for ideological nationalism
justified in the face of rising religious-ideological nationalism next door in
India. I have lived through the times when Pakistan’s intelligentsia was
confused in the face of Indian secularism and democracy. Despite having their
own country, there would be an internal conversation about the Indian
experiment being better. The last four to five years has brought about a change
in that thinking.
The BJP leadership of the
last five years cannot be held entirely responsible for all the political and
sociological change. If anything, the last four years have helped expose the
true colours of the rising Indian middle-class that does not necessarily think
very differently from the Hindutva supporter on certain issues. There is no
sign that the Congress under Rahul Gandhi would have the gumption to change the
course of society. Hearing the young Congress leader speak at a university in
London, he did not seem to possess the temerity to deviate markedly from the
ideological path that the BJP has chosen for India. However, there is an
opinion in Pakistan that a Congress-led government, or any dispensation other
than the present formulation, may be more cautious in how it approaches issues
in the region.
Meanwhile,
the general sense is that with Modi at the helm of affairs, war and conflict
will mark the tone of relations between the two countries. However, this would
be beneficial for Pakistan’s nationalist project that gets strengthened with
every news of mob lynching of Muslims and other minorities, from India. This is
not to argue that the state of minorities in Pakistan is any better: But New
Delhi no longer represents a secular ideal. For Islamabad, a non-secular India
is easier to contest.
The only
limitation that Pakistan faces in fighting a BJP-led India is its own internal
problems, like the dearth of financial resources, and not the intent. This also
means that conflict cannot remain the only shrill refrain: A resolution would
have to be negotiated for which the establishment in Rawalpindi prefers a
BJP-governed India. Khan’s statement basically means that he, and others who
share his thinking, believe that a strong right-wing government is the only
credible element with which Pakistan could settle its matters. The question
then is, what happened after the Lahore declaration? Wasn’t it a BJP-government
that was willing to talk peace? Or, what happened to the peace initiative
between the A B Vajpayee and Pervez Musharraf governments?
Seen purely from
the Pakistani establishment’s perspective, Kargil happened because the military
wanted an equaliser at a time when the political government had not taken it
into confidence. As far as the breakdown of talks at Agra are concerned, the
right-wing in India was divided at the time and the segment represented by L K
Advani did not want peace. For Rawalpindi, Modi represents a neat synthesis of
India’s right-wing. Hence, the negotiations would be more comprehensive than
ever before. The only problem, however, remains that how does one predict
Pakistan’s deep state — whose contours, today, are even more difficult to
define.
This understanding
goes hand in hand with the thinking that the pragmatism of the Hindu right-wing
would not stop Delhi from talking to Pakistan despite the latter’s habitual
U-turn from peace initiatives. While the emphasis following most track-II
dialogues, particularly after a bilateral crisis, is on the Indian members of
the group to apprise their counterparts of the anger in India, the Pakistani
side has always maintained that it is possible to pick up the conversation
thread from where it was dropped. A decade into this behaviour, there is barely
anyone on Pakistan’s side with the capacity to remind their own the highly
problematic nature of this approach.
Not unlike today’s
India, the cost of dissent in Pakistan is very high. There is little traction
in the corridors of power towards an alternative approach to resolving the
conflict. The deep state in Pakistan — which is not necessarily the entire
military, but is symbolised by it — has gained excessive control of all
discussions and dialogue. There is also the confidence that international and
regional geopolitics allows Rawalpindi the opportunity to continue with its old
approach. Money matters are critical, but it will not force a course correction
unless Pakistan reaches a breaking point.
The
re-election of BJP may not necessarily mean a sturdier India. It will certainly
be a more defiant India. Notwithstanding Khan’s desire, a peace initiative
would become less of a possibility, unless a foreign player forces Pakistan’s
hand and Delhi does a tactical readjustment. Until then, any communication
between the two civil societies will become even more difficult.
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