India’s Shadow Bank Tumult Casts a Widening Gloom
Bloomberg
February 11, 2019
Andy Mukherjee
It’s time India’s policy
makers acknowledged the real problem facing the country’s shadow banks. What
they are experiencing is no longer a vanilla liquidity shortage; the entire
industry has crashed against a wall of mistrust.
On
the other side of that wall are a clutch of wealthy property developers
and their middle-class customers, as well as teeming multitudes of poor.
Everyone is at risk.
A
crisis of confidence has made financiers’ own borrowing costs jump. The
excess yield over government securities that the bond market is demanding from
double A-rated firms is three standard deviations higher than the
five-year average.
The collapse of the highly
rated infrastructure operator-financier IL&FS Group exposed the fault lines
under Indian shadow banks’ impressive credit edifice. Non-bank lenders
contributed 30 percent of all advances in the economy over the past
three years, with a fifth of their funding coming from commercial paper and
short-maturity nonconvertible debentures, the bulk of which were lapped up
by yield-hungry mutual funds.
The panic attack from sudden IL&FS defaults in September made the funding
markets wary. If the concerns were only about liquidity, they should have
subsided by now. Yet shadow financiers’ borrowing costs are
refusing to budge. This is despite authorities sequestering IL&FS’s $12.8 billion debt under a bankruptcy process; pumping
$33 billion of durable liquidity into the banking system; marshaling state-run
lenders to buy finance firms’ assets; and replacing a hawkish central bank
governor with a former bureaucrat willing to cut interest rates and ease risk weights for bank advances to specialist
lenders.
But why stop at just the
lenders? Their borrowers, too, deserve attention. As I recently noted, shadow
banks like Dewan Housing Finance Corp., whose share price has fallen 84 percent
since early September, now pose a spillover risk by being forced to curb their
exposure to the construction industry. Property analytics firm Liases Foras reckons that
India’s top 90 builders need $6 billion a year to service their debt, yet they
are earning only a little over $3 billion before interest, taxes and
depreciation annually. Refinancing from shadow banks is crucial to their
survival. Real-estate bankruptcies would boomerang back on nonbank lenders’
balance sheets.
The collateral damage may
include India’s poor. Microfinance lenders are only now turning the page
on Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s November 2016 ban on most currency notes.
Back then, women borrowing small sums of money for sewing, food delivery or
flower supplies were crippled when their cash-only businesses collapsed for
lack of notes. The going rate for weaving golden threads into a sari crashed to
4,000 rupees ($56), from 7,000 rupees. Defaults became rampant. Companies like
M Power Micro Finance Pvt. wrote off bad debt and gave new advances to
help women entrepreneurs get back on their feet. When I visited one of the
firm’s collection centers in Thane on the outskirts of Mumbai recently,
only about 146 of the 4,000 accounts were delinquent. About half of these had
remained unpaid for less than 90 days.
Demonetization
notwithstanding, access to credit at the bottom of the pyramid has been one of
India’s successes over the past several years, largely following the model of
Bangladesh’s Grameen Bank in lending to groups of women. Whereas lenders were
hamstrung earlier by the absence of credit histories, loan reporting to
registries like Equifax Inc.’s India unit or its rival TransUnion CIBIL is
mandatory now.
The
availability of data has allowed for faster and cheaper client acquisition as
well as better risk management. Institutions usually shy away from first-time
borrowers who already have two existing lenders. Someone who has repaid one
loan finds it easier to tap three credit providers. Collection efficiency at
Bharat Financial Inclusion Ltd., which is merging with a bank, is back to 99.7
percent on loans provided after the currency ban scare had subsided.
Given the nervousness in the
funding markets, it won’t be easy for the microlenders to raise fresh equity.
In a place like Thane, borrowers have a choice of half a dozen credit
providers. Spreads are regulated. The 25-percent plus interest
rates on microloans can’t keep rising with the lenders’ cost of capital if
the base rate of conventional banks doesn’t also move up.
Originating loans and selling them on as securities to
better-capitalized institutions like State Bank of India is an option. But
smaller financiers can’t get rating firms to certify that loan losses on
portfolios will remain low. While the creditworthiness of the poor is high,
it’s vulnerable to natural calamities, political intervention like farm-debt
waivers, and policy disasters like demonetization.
The net result may be a tightening of lending standards and
curbs on fresh credit. Value addition from selling vegetables or making
papadums may not matter much to GDP, but the consumption boost from tiny
enterprises — for instance, for two-wheeler demand — would become painfully
evident if it were to go away. That’s one more reason to mind the shadow
banks’ funding gap.
Reference:https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-02-11/india-s-shadow-tumult-casts-a-widening-gloom
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