Full Text of Modi Government's Note on How it Decided to Buy 36 Rafale Jets
The Wire
November
17, 2018
Details of the Steps in the Decision-Making Process Leading to
the Award of 36 Rafale Fighter Aircraft Order
Order of
Hon’ble Supreme Court Dated 10 October 2018.
1. The Hon’ble
Supreme Court in its order has mentioned that “We would like to be apprised by
the Government of the details of of the steps in the decision making process
leading to the award of the order for the defence equipment in question ie.
Rafale Jet-Fighters (36 in number)”.
2. It has also
been mentioned in the Honb’le Supreme Court order that “we also make it clear
that the steps in the decision making process that we would like to be apprised
of would not cover the issue of pricing or the question of technical
suitability of the equipment for purposes of the requirement of the Indian Air
Force”.
3. The
procurement process laid down in the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) has
been completely followed for the procurement of 36 Rafale aircraft.
Defence
procurement procedure (DPP)
4. Post Kargil
war, a new set of defence procurement management structures and systems were
set up in the Ministry of Defence in 2001 in pursuance of the recommendations
of the Group of Ministers on reforming the National Security System. The
procedures for defence procurement were comprehensively reviewed and the
Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) -2002 was introduced in December 2002
recognizing the uniqueness of Defence Procurement and to ensure expeditious
procurement of the approved requirements of the Armed Forces in terms of
capabilities sought and timeframe prescribed by optimally utilizing the
allocated budgetary resources. The scope of these procedures have been
successively revised and enlarged through periodical reviews resulting in the
promulgation of OPP-2005, 2006, 2008, 2011, 2013 and 2016 to include aspects of
indigenous manufacture, Transfer of Technology (ToT), offsets. etc.
Since 2002,
more than 1100 contracts valued at Rs 7.45 lakh crore have been successfully
concluded using the Defence Procurement Procedure.
5. The preamble
to the DPP captures its essence. It states that “defence acquisition is not a
standard open market commercial form of procurement and has certain unique
features such as supplier constraints, technological complexity, foreign
suppliers, high cost, foreign exchange implications and geopolitical
ramifications”. “As a result, decision making pertaining to defence procurement
remains unique and complex.” It also states that “Defence procurement involves
long gestation periods and delay in procurement will impact the preparedness of
our forces.” “The needs of the armed forces being a non-negotiable and an
uncompromising aspect, flexibility in the procurement process is requires,
which has also been provisioned for.”
6. The Defence
Procurement Procedure-2013 (DPP-2013) was followed in 36 Rafale aircraft
procurement. DPP-2913, as also previous DPPs and DPP-2016, provide for defence
acquisition through competitive bidding or through Inter Government Agencies
(IGA).
The acquisition
process includes the following: -
A) Preparation
of Services Qualitative Requirements (SQRs)- user requirements
B) Acceptance of Necessity (AoN) by the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) for major cases
C)Solicitation of Offers
D) Evaluation of Technical Offers by the Technical Evaluation Committee (TEC) ‘
E) Field Evaluation (Trials)
F) Staff Evaluation (Analysis of Field Evaluation results and short listing)
G) Oversight by Technical Oversight Committee (TOC) (Provide expert oversight over the Technical Evaluation process)
H) Commercial Negotiations by the Contract Negotiation Committee (CNC)
I) Approval of the Competent Financial Authority (CFA)
J) Award of Contract/ Supply Order (SO) and
K) Contract Administration and Post-Contract Management
B) Acceptance of Necessity (AoN) by the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) for major cases
C)Solicitation of Offers
D) Evaluation of Technical Offers by the Technical Evaluation Committee (TEC) ‘
E) Field Evaluation (Trials)
F) Staff Evaluation (Analysis of Field Evaluation results and short listing)
G) Oversight by Technical Oversight Committee (TOC) (Provide expert oversight over the Technical Evaluation process)
H) Commercial Negotiations by the Contract Negotiation Committee (CNC)
I) Approval of the Competent Financial Authority (CFA)
J) Award of Contract/ Supply Order (SO) and
K) Contract Administration and Post-Contract Management
7. The DAC is
the highest body headed by Hon‘ble Raksha Mantri for Defence Procurement which
also includes all Service Chiefs, Defence Secretary, Secretary (Defence
Production), Secretary, Defence R&D and Secretary, Defence Finance.
8. Para 71 of
DPP-2013 on Inter-Government Agreement (IGA) states that “there may be
occasions when procurements would have. to be done from friendly foreign
countries which may be necessitated due to geo-strategic advantages that are
likely to accrue to the country. Such procurements would not classically follow
the Standard Procurement Procedure and the. Standard Contract Document but
would be based on mutually agreed provisions by the Governments of both the
countries.
Such
procurements will be done based on a IGA after clearance from Competent
Financial Authority (CFA)”. The CFA for procurement cases valued at more than
Rs.1000 crores was the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) during the DPP 2013.
9. Further,
Para 72 of DPP-2013 mentions that “In case of large value acquisition, especially
that requiring product support over a long period of time, it may be advisable
to enter into a separate Inter Government Agreement (if not already covered
under an umbrella agreement covering all cases) with the Government of the
country from which the equipment is proposed to be procured after the requisite
inter-ministerial consultation. Such an Inter Governmental Agreement is
expected to safeguard the interests of the Government of India and should also
provide for the assistance of the foreign Government in case the contracts)
runs into an unforeseen problem.”
10. The IGA is
typically an assurance from a sovereign foreign government for assistance in
case of unforeseen problems, e.g. international sanctions. contractor failure,
need to integrate more sophisticated weaponry, requirement of product support
etc. IGA provides geo-strategic advantage to the country placing it at
advantageous position compared to its adversaries. lGA also facilitates and
strengthens the foreign industry’s commitment for long-term support for the
equipment and spares through a matching commitment by a sovereign government.
11. Defence
procurement quite often involves sovereign governments because of issues like
transfer of certain technologies and security perceptions of the producing
countries. Procurements from USA and Russia are typically done in terms of such
umbrella agreements like Foreign Military Sales (FMS)/ Standard Clauses of
Contract (SCOC). Of the total procurement of about Rs 7.45 lakh crore since
2002 under DPP, IGAs of different kind including FMS and SCOC account for
nearly 40%. Special Government to Government arrangements with Russia, USA and
other countries have been made to ensure smooth procurement and supply of
spares, refits and upgrades etc. Producer countries and the private firms also
insist on special security protocols to protect Intellectual Property Rights
(IPRS) and the classified information.
12. To promote
indigenisation, a robust offset clause has been included in the Defence
Procurement Procedure (DPP) since 2005. The aim is to leverage our capital
acquisitions to develop the Indian defence industry, improve defence research
and encourage the development of synergistic sectors such as civil aerospace
and internal security. The offsets are to ensure that for every dollar that
went to a foreign arms supplier. 30—50% get back into India for an investment
or procurement. As per DPP-2013, the offset clause would be applicable for all
procurement proposals where indicative cost is Rs 300 crore or more involving
outright purchase from foreign / Indian vendors and purchases from foreign
vendors followed by licensed production. The offset discharge is to be
undertaken through various offset avenues like direct purchase of eligible
products/services, FDI in JV and transfer of technology/provision of equipment.
As per the Defence Offset Guidelines, the vendor/ Original Equipment
manufacturer (OEM) is free to select its Indian Offset Partners (IOPs) for
implementing the offset obligation.
Background
13. The Indian
Air Force has an approved strength of __ fighter squadrons to achieve
capability to counter a two front scenario. It has been making efforts to
procure new aircraft to replace several ageing planes due to be phased out.
In-principle approval for the procurement of 126 fighter aircraft was granted by
the the hon’ble Raksha Mantri in June, 2001. Services Qualitative Requirements
(SQRs) in essence user requirements, were prepared on 08 June 2006. The Defence
Acquisition Council (DAC) granted Acceptance of Necessity (AoN) on 29th June,
2007 for procurement of 126 Medium Multi Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) which
included 18 flyaway aircraft equivalent to a single squadron, from the Original
Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) and 108 under license manufacture by HAL to be
delivered over the period of 11 years from the date of signing of contract.
Bids for 126 fighter aircraft were issued on 28th August 2007.
14. Six vendors
submitted their proposals on 28th April, 2008. Technical evaluations were
approved in June 2009 and Field Evaluations conducted from July 2009 to May
2010. The Staff Evaluation Report was accepted in April 2011 wherein Rafale
(M/s Dassault Aviation) and Eurofighter (M.s EADS) qualified field evaluations.
Technical Oversight Committee report was approved in June 2011. The commercial
bids were opened in November, 2011 and M/s Dassault Aviation was determined as
L1 in January 2012. Contract Negotiations commenced from February 2012. In the
context of letters received and the issues raised relating to the determination
of the L1 vendor. The-then Hon‘ble Raksha Mantri directed that the independent
Monitors be requested to examine the issues related to the determination of L1.
The Independent Monitors cleared the process.
15. It was
proposed to the Hon’ble Raksha Mantri that the CNC may proceed to expeditiously
complete its discussions with the Ll vendor and finalize its report for further
action for seeking CFA approval. Though the Independent Monitors had cleared
the process, the then Hon’ble Raksha Mantri directed in June 2012 that “the CNC
may proceed to complete its deliberations with the L1 vendor and finalize its
report. After the CNC report has been finalized, the entire issue of approach
and methodology adopted by the CNC to determine the L1 vendor may be
re-examined by MOD (Fin) and MoD to ascertain that it is reasonable,
appropriate and as per the laid down procedure.”
16. In addition
to the above, the contract negotiations could not conclude mainly due to
unresolved issues related to 108 aircraft to be manufactured in India. These
issues pertained to lack of common understanding between HALand Dassault
Aviation on following: -
i) Man-Hours
that would be required to produce the aircraft in India: HAL required 2.7 times
higher Man-House compared to the French side for the manufacture of Rafale
aircraft in India.
ii) Dassault
Aviation as the seller was required to undertake necessary contractual
obligation for 126 aircraft (18 direct flyaway and 108 aircraft manufactured in
India) as per RFP requirements. Issues related to contractual obligation and
responsibility for 108 aircraft manufactured in India could not be resolved.
17. The above
issues remained unresolved for more than three years. This delay impacted the
cost of acquisition, as the offer was with in-built escalation and was
influenced by the Euro-Rupee exchange rate variations.
18. As the
contract negotiations reached a stalemate and REP compliance could not be
ensured, the process for RFP withdrawal was initiated in March 2015 and RFP for
126 MMRCA was finally withdrawn in June 2015.
19. During this
long period of inconclusive 126 MMRCA process our adversaries inducted modern
aircraft and upgraded their older versions. They acquired better capability
air-to-air missiles and inducted their indigenous fighters in large numbers.
Further, they modernized and inducted aircraft with advanced weapon and radar
capabilities. As per available information, our
adversaries inducted more than 400 lighters (equivalent to more than 20 Squadrons) during the period from 2010 to 2013. They not only inducted 4th Generation Aircraft but also inducted 5th Generation Stealth Fighter Aircraft. The combined effect of our own reducing combat potential and our adversaries enhancing their combat potential made the situation asymmetrical and extremely critical. An urgent need was felt to arrest the decline in the number of fighter squadrons in IAF and enhance their combat capabilities.
adversaries inducted more than 400 lighters (equivalent to more than 20 Squadrons) during the period from 2010 to 2013. They not only inducted 4th Generation Aircraft but also inducted 5th Generation Stealth Fighter Aircraft. The combined effect of our own reducing combat potential and our adversaries enhancing their combat potential made the situation asymmetrical and extremely critical. An urgent need was felt to arrest the decline in the number of fighter squadrons in IAF and enhance their combat capabilities.
20. In view of
the above, through the lndo-French Joint Statement issued on 10th April 2015,
an intent was brought out for acquisition of 36 Rafale jets (two squadrons) in
fly-away condition, on terms which would be better than conveyed by M/s
Dassault Aviation in the process which was already underway.
21. The
following Indo-French Joint Statement was issued on 10th April 2015 by the two
countries for supply of 36 fly-away Rafale aircraft: “Government of lndia
conveyed to the Government of France that in view of critical operational
necessity for Multirole Combat Aircraft for Indian Air Force (IAF). Government
of India would like to acquire 36 Rafale jets in fly-away condition as quickly
as possible.The two leaders agreed to conclude an lnter-Governmental Agreement
for supply of the aircraft on terms that would be better than conveyed by Dassault
Aviation as part of a separate process underway; the delivery would be in a
time frame that would be compatible with the operational requirement of IAF and
that the aircraft and associated systems and weapons would be delivered on the
same configuration as had been tested and approved by IAF, and with a longer
maintenance responsibility by France”
Decision-making
process followed in acquisition of 36 Rafale aircraft
22. In the case
for procurement 36 Rafale aircraft, all the requisite steps i.e. preparation of
Services Qualitative Requirements (SQR), Acceptance of Necessity (AoN) by
Defence Acquisition Council (DAC), Technical Evaluation and acceptance of
technically qualified platform, commercial negotiations by Contract Negotiation
Committee (CNC) and approval of Competent Financial Authority (CFA) as per
requirement of Defence Procurement Procedure 2013 have been followed which is
explained in the subsequent paragraphs.
23. The
acquisition process for MMRCA had reached commercial evaluation stage aficr
completion of all the standard processes as per DPP. As stipulated in the
Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) 2013, approval of the Defence Acquisition
Council (DAC) for procurement of 36 fly-away Rafale aircraft from the French
Government through Inter-Governmental Agreement (IGA) was taken on 13‘h May
2015. The background of the case was brought to the notice of the DAC where it
was mentioned that operational capability of 36 Rafale aircrafi will he in
accordance with the SQR for the procurement of MMRCA. It was further brought to
the notice of the DAC that 36 Rafale aircraft will equip two squadrons and
operate from two operating bases.
24. An Indian
Negotiating Team (lNT) was constituted to negotiate the terms and conditions of
the Procurement of 36 Rafale aircraft with the french Government team. The INT
was headed by the Deputy Chief of Air Staff of IAF and comprised of the Joint
Secretary and Acquisition Manager (Air), Joint Secretary (Defence Offset
Management Wing), Joint Secretary and Additional Financial Advisor, Finance Manager
(Air), Advisor (Cost) and assistant Chief of Air Staff (Plans) as members from
Indian Government side. The French side was headed by the Director General of
Armament (DGA), Ministry of Defense, Government of France.
25.
Negotiations between INT and the French side started in May 2015 and continued
upto April 2016. A total of 74 meetings, which included 48 internal INT
meetings and 26 external INT meetings with French side were held during the
negotiations. As mandated by the DAC, the INT undertook a collegiate process
involving due deliberations and diligence at various levels during the
negotiations. Aspects pertaining to the responsibility and obligations of
French Government, pricing, delivery schedule, maintenance terms, offsets, lGA
terms, etc. were discussed and negotiated during these meetings.
26. The
proposal for procurement of 36 Rafale was presented to the DAC on three
occasions between 28th August and 11th September 2015 and subsequently on 11th
January 2016 and 14th July 2016 for approvals on various aspects of the
negotiations and directions. As mandated by the DAC, the lNT completed its
negotiations and arrived at better terms relating to price, delivery and
maintenance as compared to the MMRCA offer of lVl/s Dassault Aviation. The INT
report was finalized and signed on 21st July 2016. The TNT report also indicated
better terms and conditions arrived at as a result of negotiation as compared
to 126 MMRCA case and achievements of Negotiating Team.
27. Chairman,
INT submitted the report on 4th August, 2016 and recommended the case to be
progressed for CCS approval & Signing the IGA. The INT report and the
proposal for obtaining approval of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) was
processed in Ministry of Defence. After inter-ministerial consultations with
Finance Ministry and Ministry of Law and Justice, the proposal was placed
before the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) on 24th August, 2016. The
approval of Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) for signing of the IGA for
procurement of 36 Rafale aircraft along with Aircraft Package Supply Protocol,
Weapons Package Supply Protocol, Technical Arrangement and Offset Contracts
were signed on 23rd September 2016. The IGA was signed by the Hon’ble Raksha
Mantri and the French Defence Minister on behalf of Government of India and the
Government of France respectively.
28. In so far
as the discharging of the offset obligations by OEM and its Tier-I vendors
through Indian Offset Partners (101’s) is concerned, there is no mention of any
private Indian Business House(s) in 10A or Offset Contract. The Offset Contract
does not envisage manufacture of 36 Rafale Aircraft in lndia by any public or
private sector firm. As per the Offset Contract, the
vendor/GEM is required to confirm the details of IOPs I products either at the time of seeking offset credits or one year prior to discharge of offset obligation. The annual offset implementation schedule, as per offset contract, will commence from October 2019. The vendor/ DEM is yet to submit a formal proposal in the prescribed manner indicating details of IOPs and products for offset discharge.
vendor/GEM is required to confirm the details of IOPs I products either at the time of seeking offset credits or one year prior to discharge of offset obligation. The annual offset implementation schedule, as per offset contract, will commence from October 2019. The vendor/ DEM is yet to submit a formal proposal in the prescribed manner indicating details of IOPs and products for offset discharge.
29. It is
reiterated that the procurement process as laid down in the Defence Procurement
Procedure (DPP)-2013 was followed in procurement of 36 Rafale aircraft. The
approval of DAC for procurement of 36 Rafale aircraft was taken. Indian
Negotiating Team (INT) was constituted which conducted negotiations with the
French side for about a year and approval of CCS being CFA was taken before
signing the IGA.
OFFSETS
The Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India in its Order dated 31st October, 2018 has also mentioned
that “Further details that couId legitimately come in the Public Domain with
regard to the induction of the Indian Offset Partner (if any) be also furnished
to the Learned Counsels of the Parties, as well as Petitioners in person”.
2. The
following details are already included in another paper separately being
provided giving “Details of the Steps in the Decision Making Process leading to
the award of 36 Rafale Fighter Aircraft Order”.
3. Offset
obligations can be discharged by the vendors by any one or a combination of the
following offset discharge avenues. This is a summarized version from the DPP:-
A) Direct
purchase or executing export orders for eligible products manufactured by or
services provided by Indian enterprises, i.e. Defence Public Sector Undertaking
(DPSU), Ordinance Factory Board (OFB) and private and public sector Indian
enterprises.
B) Foreign
Direct Investment in joint ventures with Indian enterprises (equity investment)
for the manufacture and for maintenance of eligible products and provision of
eligible services.
C) Investment
in kind in terms of Transfer of Technology (TOT) to Indian enterprises for the
manufacture and/or maintenance of eligible products and provision of eligible
services
D) Investment
in kind in lndian enterprise in terms of provision of equipment through the
non-equity route for the manufacture and or maintenance of eligible products
and provision of eligible services (excluding ToT, civil infrastructure and
second hand equipment)
E) Provision of
equipment and/or ToT to government institutions and establishments engaged in
the manufacture and/or maintenance of eligible products and provision of
eligible services including DRDO.
F) Technology
Acquisition by the Defence Research Development Organisation (DRDO) in areas of
high technology.
Process
followed for discharge of offset obligations
4. The vendor
of the equipment will be responsible for fulfilment of offset obligations.
Offset obligations are to be discharged within the period of performance of the
offset contract. The vendor may also allow his Tier-1 sub vendors to discharge
offset obligations to the extent of work share by value in the main procurement
contract, on behalf of the vendor. A Tier-1 sub vendor is one who is directly
supplying equipment/ services to the Platform under procurement.
5. Offset
obligations are undertaken by vendors/Tier-1 sub vendors through Indian
enterprises and institutions and establishments engaged in the manufacture of
eligible products/ provision of eligible services. who are referred to as the
Indian Offset Partner (IOP). The IOP shall comply with guidelines licensing
requirements stipulated by Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion
(DIPP). Both the vendor and Tier-1 sub vendors are free to choose / select any
Indian Offset Partner (IOP) provided the IOP has not been barred from doing
business by the MoD.
6. However as
per the extant provisions of the DPP, if the vendor is unable to provide
details of IOP at the time of submission of offset proposal prior to offset
contract, he is permitted to provide the details of their IOPs either at the
time of seeking offset credits or one year prior to discharge of offset
obligations.
7. The Defence
Offset Management Wing (DOMW) under the Department of Defence Production (DDP)
is responsible for all matters relating to post contract management which
includes monitoring of discharge of offset obligations including audit and
review of progress reports received from the vendor.
8. Post
contract the vendor submits six monthly offset reports and necessary supporting
documents to DOMW. These offset discharge reports are then independently
audited by the Controller General of Defence Accounts (CGDA) to ascertain
veracity of the transactions vis-a-vis offset contract. Based on the audit
report submitted by the CGDA offset credits are granted or penalties if
applicable are levied. Offset guidelines also have provisions for change of
iOP. product. offset component and rephasing of period of performance. which
can be availed by vendor. post approval of MoD.
9. The offset
contracts under the Rafale lGA are governed by the offset guidelines of DPP
2013. As per offset guidelines the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) may
prescribe varying offset obligation above 30% in special cases. Accordingly, an
offset obligation of 50% was prescribed for the Rafale aircraft IGA.
10. Two offset
contracts were also signed. One with M/s Dassault Aviation and another with M/s
MDBA, on 23 September 2016, the same day on which an Inter-Governmental
Agreement (IGA) was signed between the Government of lndia and Government of
France for the procurement of 36 Rafale aircraft. The following further details
pertaining to offset contracts of 36 Rafaie procurement are provided:-
Offset
contracts in 36 Rafale IGA
11(a) The two
offset contracts with Mls Dassault Aviation and M/s MBDA who are the French
industrial suppliers of the Aircraft Package and Weapon Package respectively
have a period of performance comprising seven years.
(b) it has been
indicated in the offset schedule that details of lOPs/products will be confirmed
by vendors either at the time of seeking offset credits or one year prior to
discharge of offset obligations.
(c) There are
no offset obligations in the first three years. As per the contract, vendor’s
offset obligations are to commence from the fourth year. ie. from Oct 2019
onwards.
(d) Mandatory
six-monthly reports have been submitted by both the vendors and indicate NIL
offset discharge. The last six-monthly report has been received from Mls
Dassault Aviation on 17 July 2018 for the period ending 30 June 2018 and from
M/s MBDA on 22 January 2018 for the period ending 31 December 2017.
(e) In addition
to offset obligation discharged by the two vendors – M/s Dassault Aviation and
M/s MBDA, offset obligations will also be discharged by 21 Tier-l sub-vendors
& 12 Tier-l sub vendors which have been permitted by M/s Dassault Aviation
and M/s MBDA, respectively, to do so on their behalf. The share of M/s Dassault
Aviation in the total offsets is 19.9% only and that of M/s MBDA is 6.27%
(f) Critical
technology acquisition projects with DRDO are foreseen to be included in the
offset contracts depending on the discussions with DRDO and the vendors.
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